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Digital media have today an enormous diffusion, and their influence on the behavior
of a vast part of the human population can hardly be underestimated. In this review
I propose that cultural evolution theory, including both a sophisticated view of human
behavior and a methodological attitude to modeling and quantitative analysis, provides
a useful framework to study the effects and the developments of media in the digital
age. I will first give a general presentation of the cultural evolution framework, and
I will then introduce this more specific research program with two illustrative topics.
The first topic concerns how cultural transmission biases, that is, simple heuristics
such as “copy prestigious individuals” or “copy the majority,” operate in the novel
context of digital media. The existence of transmission biases is generally justified
with their adaptivity in small-scale societies. How do they operate in an environment
where, for example, prestigious individuals possess not-relevant skills, or popularity is
explicitly quantified and advertised? The second aspect relates to fidelity of cultural
transmission. Digitally-mediated interactions support cheap and immediate high-fidelity
transmission, in opposition, for example, to oral traditions. How does this change the
content that is more likely to spread? Overall, I suggest the usefulness of a “long view”
to our contemporary digital environment, contextualized in cognitive science and cultural
evolution theory, and I discuss how this perspective could help us to understand what is
genuinely new and what is not.
Keywords: cultural evolution, cultural transmission, transmission biases, cultural attraction, digital media, social
media
1. INTRODUCTION
Digital media are media encoded in digital format, typically to be transmitted and consumed on
electronic devices, such as computers and smartphones. Digital media of wide diffusion includes
emails, digital audio and video recordings, ebooks, blogs, instant messaging, and more recently
social media. Although, digital media started to be developed with the creation of digital computers
in the 1940s, their wide cultural impact can be traced back only to two or three decades, with the
widespread diffusion of personal computers and especially the internet (Briggs and Burke, 2009).
Social media and ubiquitous connectivity (e.g., allowed by portable digital devices) are even
more recent developments. Facebook, in its early stage limited to university or high-school students
and employees of a handful of companies, was open to the public 10 years ago, in September 2006
(Boyd and Ellison, 2007). The first version of the iPhone, which gave the initial momentum to the
worldwide diffusion of smartphones, was launched shortly after, at the beginning of 2007 (West
and Mace, 2010).
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Despite that, digital media, and social media in particular,
have today an enormous reach. Facebook for example counts, as
of June 2016, more than 1.7 billion monthly active users1. The
influence of digital media on the behavior of a vast part of the
human population is unanimously recognized. As a consequence,
academic interest for digital media has grown rapidly in different
disciplines. Here, I will not attempt a review of the existing
literature, but I will propose that a specific scientific field, cultural
evolution, could provide a suitable framework to analyse how
the massive diffusion of digital media influences human cultural
behavior.
The article is structured as follows. In the next section I will
provide a brief and general introduction to the field of cultural
evolution, focusing on the aspects I consider more relevant
for the study of contemporary digital media. These aspects are
cultural evolution’s naturalistic and quantitative approach and
its commitment to develop hypotheses informed by cognitive
science and evolutionary theory. I will then explore more in
depth two areas of research where cultural evolution could
give an original contribution. First, I will discuss how cultural
transmission biases, i.e., simple rules such as “copy the majority”
or “copy prestigious individuals,” a central topic in cultural
evolutionary research, might influence cultural transmission in
the digital age, and conversely how digitally-supported cultural
transmission might disrupt these biases. I will explore at some
length two of these biases, related to prestige and popularity.
Second, I will examine how cultural evolutionary dynamics
could be influenced by the fact that digitally-supported cultural
transmission allows virtually error-free propagation of cultural
traits. I will conclude suggesting that the cultural evolution
framework places the digital age in a broader context, and I will
discuss how this theoretical and historical “long view” could help
us to better understand the changes we are confronted with in
our society.
2. CULTURAL EVOLUTION
Cultural evolution is a relatively recent scientific field that
studies human and, partly, non-human cultural behavior (see
Mesoudi, 2015, for a recent review). Cultural behavior is generally
defined as behavior transmitted through social learning, as
opposed to individual learning or genetic inheritance (Henrich
and McElreath, 2003). The distinction between cultural and
non-cultural behavior is not a sharp one (Morin, 2015) but it
works quite well for practical purposes. Cultural evolutionists
study things such as the evolution of uniquely human forms of
cooperation (Boyd and Richerson, 2009; Turchin et al., 2013),
indigenous knowledge of plants’ properties (Reyes-Garcia et al.,
2008), the cultural evolution of language (Tamariz et al., 2014;
Kirby et al., 2015), the spread of fashions in contemporary
culture, using cases like baby names (Bentley et al., 2004) or
dog breeds (Ghirlanda et al., 2013, 2014), or how ineffective
medical treatments can nonetheless be successful (Tanaka et al.,
2009; de Barra et al., 2014; Miton et al., 2015), just to give
a few examples. Similarly, a wide range of methodologies are
1https://newsroom.fb.com/company-info/
used, including simulation and mathematical models (Acerbi
et al., 2009; Kempe et al., 2014; Smaldino and McElreath, 2016),
laboratory experiments (Caldwell and Smith, 2012; Derex and
Boyd, 2015; Muthukrishna et al., 2015; Schillinger et al., 2016),
phylogenetic analysis (Fortunato and Jordan, 2010; Tehrani,
2013; Watts et al., 2015), ethnographic research (Mathew and
Boyd, 2014; Colleran and Mace, 2015), and comparative studies
of social learning in humans and other animals (Whiten et al.,
2009; Dean et al., 2012; Reindl et al., 2016).
What brings together all these researches is, more than
a unitary view about how culture should be considered an
evolutionary process (see Claidière et al., 2014; Acerbi and
Mesoudi, 2015; Lewens, 2015, for a general discussion), a strong
commitment to provide explanations that are naturalistic and
quantitative, as well as grounded in cognitive science and
evolutionary theory. At the minimum, all cultural evolutionists
share the idea that a cultural phenomenon is a population-level
aggregate of individual-level interactions and that, to explain
the former, one needs to take seriously the latter. Accordingly,
the works of Cavalli-Sforza and Feldman (1981) and Boyd and
Richerson (1985) are considered as establishing modern cultural
evolution. These works consisted in mathematical models,
inspired by population genetics, developing formalisms to link
micro-processes of transmission—like different “directions” of
transmission, e.g., from parents to offsprings, between peers, etc.
or different transmission biases, see below—to macro-processes
of cultural change—like the diffusion dynamics of cultural traits.
In parallel, cognitive anthropologists such as Sperber (1985,
1996) started to consider in depth the role of individual cognition
in the explanation of cultural patterns, focusing on the fact that
the success of some widespread beliefs may depend on them
being generally attractive to human minds (I will discuss some
examples in the next sections).
The psychology of digital media, in particular online activities
(sometimes described as “cyberpsychology” Attrill, 2015) is a
growing field (see e.g., Wallace, 2001; Suler, 2015). A cultural
evolution approach adds, as mentioned, an explicit interest
for the micro-macro link, in other words, for how individual-
level properties (e.g., psychological) influence population-level
dynamics and vice versa. In addition, the naturalistic and
quantitative framework provided by cultural evolution seems
perfectly suited for the study of contemporary digital media.
One of the opportunities that the widespread diffusion of digital
media offers to social sciences is the availability of vast amounts
of data on human behavior (Lazer et al., 2009). While the
understanding offered by ethnographic (e.g., Boyd, 2014) or
critical-theory-inspired (e.g., Fuchs, 2014) perspectives remain
clearly important, the cultural evolution approach is in a better
position to make sense also of the quantitative data that digital
media usage quasi-automatically produces. On the other side,
computer scientists and physicists had promptly made use of
these data to study the diffusion of information in digital
social networks (see Weng et al., 2012; Adamic et al., 2014;
Cooney et al., 2016; Del Vicario et al., 2016, for few recent
examples). These works importantly include quantitative analysis
and models, and they can offer valuable insights on online
activity. However, the perspective of cultural evolution can
Frontiers in Human Neuroscience | www.frontiersin.org 2 December 2016 | Volume 10 | Article 636
Acerbi A Cultural Evolution Approach to Digital Media
complement this thread of research by providing a refined view
of the micro-processes of transmission and of the psychological
motivations underpinning them.
To sum up, cultural evolution may offer a privileged
perspective to look at digital media, including both a
sophisticated view of human behavior and a methodological
attitude to modeling and quantitative analysis. In the next
sections I will try to substantiate this claim with some examples
of investigations that a cultural evolution approach suggests.
3. TRANSMISSION BIASES IN THE DIGITAL
AGE
For the majority of cultural evolutionists the widespread
utilization of social learning is the reason of the ecological
success of the human species (Henrich, 2016). Social learning
provides a shortcut to long and potentially dangerous individual
learning and a fast and flexible alternative to genetic evolution.
However, simply copying from others can be risky: to be effective,
social learning needs to be selective (Laland, 2004). According
to this view, social learning is made possible by domain-general
heuristics—often referred to as “transmission biases” or “social-
learning strategies”—helping us to choose what, when, and from
whom to learn (Boyd and Richerson, 1985). To use a mundane
example, imagine you find yourself in a new and unknown town,
searching a restaurant for dinner. You may first decide that is
worth to look to what others do, instead of trying to figure it out
by yourself (“copy when asocial learning is costly”), and then that
it does not make much sense to follow the first person you see
in the street, but look for restaurants that seem full of customers
(“copy the majority”). After few days, you might have found your
favorite place, and you can stop to check where other people go
(“copy when uncertain”).
Transmission biases are a good place to start as much
research has been developed in cultural evolution on this topic.
Theoretical models and simulations have explored the adaptive
value of different biases, and predictions from the models
have been tested in empirical settings (see Rendell et al., 2011,
for a review). In parallel, various works have attempted to
detect the presence of transmission biases in real-life cultural
dynamics (e.g., Reyes-Garcia et al., 2008; Henrich and Broesch,
2011; Kandler and Shennan, 2013; Acerbi and Bentley, 2014).
Importantly, for our focus on digital media, transmission biases
are considered a suite of psychological adaptations shaped by
natural selection (Henrich, 2016), hence generally effective in
the social and physical environment of small-scale societies. A
question only partially explored in cultural evolution is how these
biases scale in contemporary, complex, societies, and especially in
the novel digital environment.
3.1. Prestige
Various heuristics are available when choosing from whom to
copy. From an evolutionary point of view, for example, kin share
a common genetic interest, so they will be willing to circulate
useful information. Copying from parents and from other close
members of the familymakes thus perfect sense. Elders, especially
in small-scale and slow-changing societies, have two important
qualities. First, they had time to learn themselves a substantial
part of the cultural repertoire of the society, and, second, they
must have done it effectively, exactly because they arrived to
old age. Age-biased social learning is thus another evolutionary
expected strategy (Henrich, 2016).
However, for specialized expertises (i.e., only few people
possess them), or for expertises that exhibit variability in a
population (i.e., some people are very good at them and others are
not), kin- and age- based strategies are not particularly effective.
In these cases, an alternative is to try to assess directly the
ability of others. Copying skilled or successful individuals is then
another of the heuristics suggested by cultural evolutionists (see
e.g., Mesoudi, 2011, for an experimental approach). This strategy
presents, in turn, another problem. Skills can be opaque, difficult
to recognize, and this is especially true when one does not possess
the expertise in question, which is exactly the case when there is
the need to learn it. Similarly, success can be volatile, or due to
luck. How many successful hunts an apprentice hunter should
assess before deciding to copy from a particular individual and
not from another?
A possible solution is prestige-biased social learning. Cultural
evolutionist Joe Henrich defines prestige cues as a “second-order
cultural learning” (Henrich, 2016, p. 45): one can make use of
signs of deference, respect, or simply check from whom other
people are learning, and choose those individuals as cultural
models. The risk, with prestige-biased social learning, is that
prestige and skills may not correlate. What if an individual is
prestigious because of his hunting abilities, but I am attempting to
learn how to build harpoons? What if an individual is prestigious
because he belongs to an influential family, but he does not
possess any particular skill? The answer is that in small-scale
societies this is a minor problem. Specialization and inequality
are limited, so that respected individuals will indeed be, on
average, generally skilled.
Of course, the situation is different today. Our reliance on
celebrities, for example in advertisement, is generally considered
a good candidate for a cultural evolutionary mismatch (Henrich,
2016). The acting abilities of George Clooney are unlikely to
correlate with his expertise in coffee-tasting, still, the story
goes, the success of a Nestlé brand of coffee depends on the
presence of the actor in the advertisements. Internet and in
particular social media would possibly push things even further,
because the rapidity of communications and of the extension
and the number of the virtual communities. The real risk for
the society is not much that we end up to parrot the—alleged—
favorite coffee brand of celebrities, but that social media users
will attempt to copy skills that are not existent at all (such as
Clooney’s coffee tasting ability) or existent, but not relevant in
the local environment (such as Clooney’s acting ability). More
worryingly, extremist groups could make use, consciously or not,
of prestige-biased influence mechanisms for on-line proselytism
(Barkow et al., 2012)2. These ideas could be tested empirically,
but, to my knowledge, not much research has been done yet.
2See also: http://www.cato-unbound.org/2016/02/08/jerome-h-barkow/how-
internet-subverts-cultural-transmission
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One could examine whether usage of internet and social media
correlates with higher preferential attention to “global” cues of
prestige (as opposed to “local” ones), possibly taking into account
confounding factors such as the exposition to traditional mass-
media, like television or cinema. In addition, attention to global
cues of prestige does not need to be harmful, especially in a fast-
changing and deeply interconnected society. Although, it might
be argued that acting abilities are not necessarily relevant, the
same digital media allow to access also to prestigious surgeons,
programmers, or philanthropists in a way that would not be
possible in a local environment.
Research on social media “influencers” is in its infancy, and
results are not conclusive (see Bakshy et al., 2011; Aral and
Walker, 2012, and the studies reviewed therein). Bakshy et al.
(2011), for example, measured how links to webpages posted in
Twitter spread in the social media itself, and found that, indeed,
users with more followers and who have been already influential
in the past tended to produce larger “cascades.” However, it is
not clear how to distinguish the fact that the number of followers
is a sign of prestige, in the cultural evolution meaning, from the
fact that, at the same time, it indicates how many individuals
are exposed to the link. In this sense, the effect could be simply
due to a larger number of possible events of transmission. Even
not considering this confounding, Bakshy et al. (2011) comment
that, given that cascades-sizes are power-law distributed (i.e.,
there are very few large cascades, while the majority of links
are never reposted), “individual-level predictions of influence
nevertheless remain relatively unreliable.” They thus proceed to
analyse the contribute of the actual content of the links tweeted,
showing that content independently rated as more interesting
and positive generated larger cascades. These findings resonate
with theoretical results showing that wide-ranging events of
diffusion of traits in networks are favored less by influencers than
by the presence of large masses of easily influenceable individuals
(Watts and Dodds, 2007).
The same celebrity influence is, at least in cultural evolution
literature, mainly anecdotal, and marketing studies show that
the effect of celebrities in advertisements is mediated by various
cues, such as their relationship with the product advertised
(see e.g., Kelting and Rice, 2013). We do not know, for every
George Clooney, how many advertisements with celebrities did
not succeed (Stephen Hawking, for example, was featured in
the early 2000s in a high-profile campaign for an online fund
platform that closed in 2004), and how many campaigns succeed
without the presence of a celebrity. Moreover, as the results from
Bakshy et al. (2011) suggest, there is an interaction between
content and prestige. An interesting possibility is that relatively
low-cost alternatives, like which coffee brand to choose or which
haircut, could be celebrity-biased, but the effect would be less
important for high-cost choices. This would mean that prestige-
biased epidemics of extremism might not be such a realistic
danger. On the other side, Clooney would not be probably able
to persuade smokers to quit, for example.
In sum, although we have some convincing evidences of the
effect of prestige-biased social learning in small-scale societies
(Henrich and Broesch, 2011) and from laboratory experiments
(Atkisson et al., 2012; Chudek et al., 2012), the question of
how automatic is the influence of digital media’s “influencers”
in contemporary society remains open. Morin (2015) writes of
“flexible imitators” that selectively use social—such as prestige—
or asocial cues, depending on various factors, e.g., the above
mentioned cost of the alternatives. Others (Heyes, 2016b) suggest
that, at least in some circumstances, human social learning
strategies are explicitly metacognitive. This means that these
strategies include adjustable learning targets, changing from
situation to situation, such as “copy digital natives,” referring to
copying knowledgeable young persons in the specific domain of
technology, instead of a general rule “copy young individuals”
(Heyes, 2016a).
In this case, like in the others we will explore in the
next sections, the cultural evolutionary approach suggests a
perspective from which to look to digital media and a series of
questions that might be addressed in further research. What is
the difference between the usage of prestige cues in small-scale
societies and in our contemporary digital environment? What
are the differences between local prestige, as in the case of small-
scale societies or in contemporary circles of friends, and global
prestige, as in the case of celebrities? Is prestige modulated by
content? We already mentioned a possible difference between
high-cost and low-cost choices; another could be related to
the presence or absence of previous knowledge: real coffee
connoisseurs might be less impressed by Clooney’s approval.
3.2. Popularity
A similar way of reasoning can be applied to frequency-
dependent biases. In the idiom of cultural evolution, frequency-
dependent biases are heuristics that make use of the estimated
frequency of a cultural trait to help deciding whether to copy it
or not. The usefulness of positive, i.e., preferences for popular
traits, frequency-dependent biases is easy to understand.When in
a new environment, or when confronted with a new technology,
it makes sense to take advantage of the cumulative experience of
other individuals.
When cultural evolutionists talk about positive frequency-
dependent biases, they generally refers to “conformity” in a
precise and quite restrictive sense, meaning a disproportionate
tendency to copy from the majority (Boyd and Richerson, 1985).
This means that, returning to our restaurants example, if 60
people are eating in restaurant A and 40 people in restaurant
B, the probability to choose A should be higher than 60% in
conformist-biased social learning. In fact, it has been noted that,
in almost all cases, social learning imply to “follow the majority”
in a loose sense (Boyd and Richerson, 1985). In the above case,
for example, one individual would still be more likely to go to
restaurant A without any particular bias, i.e., copying randomly
(imagine to ask to a random person where she was for dinner and
follow her advice: your probability to go to restaurant A will be
60%).
This over-response to frequency information (Efferson et al.,
2008) has a special importance for cultural evolution. First, it
has been shown to contribute to maintain culturally homogenous
groups, despite certain levels of migrations and individual
variations (see e.g., Boyd and Richerson, 2009). Second, it allows
to directly “jump” to the best alternative in presence of noisy
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information (Henrich, 2016). In what follows I will thus use
the more generic term “popularity bias” to indicate that the
perception of something as popularmakes it preferable to other—
less popular—cultural traits, and I will reserve the usage of
the term “conformity” for the technical sense described above.
Finally, “social influence” simplymeans that people copy, without
any bias, the choices of others.
As in the case of prestige, it is important to draw an explicit
comparison between the conditions in which a psychological
bias implementing a preference for popular cultural traits
could have evolved and today’s digital age. The first interesting
aspect is that, in a small-scale and perhaps illiterate society,
popularity needs to be estimated from various cues. The situation
with digital media appears clearly different. Popularity is
quantified and explicitly made public—the number of Facebook
“likes” or “share,” the number of Twitter “retweets,” etc.—
in practically all digital platforms. While one could speculate
whether the success of this practice might be due to a
universal sensitivity to this kind of information, as a cultural
evolution perspective would suggest, it is not clear what kind
of effect this could have on cultural transmission patterns.
One possibility is that such low-cost availability of popularity
signals would discourage individual exploration, prompting
people to follow cheap social cues (Derex and Boyd, 2015), with
digital media amplifying the effect of popularity-biased cultural
transmission.
For example, success in digital media, especially regarding
internet websites, has been repeatedly described as following a
power-law distribution (as mentioned in the previous section
for the links posted on Twitter). Power-law distributions are
typical of winner-take-all markets, with very few websites
monopolizing visitors whereas the vast majority remains
relatively unsuccessful (Adamic and Huberman, 2000). However,
it is useful to remind that power-law distributions are
not necessarily generated by popularity-biased dynamics, as
defined above. Power-law distributions naturally arise with
unbiased social influence, because simply copying at random
amplifies small initial differences. In fact, cultural evolutionary
studies have shown that power-law distributions are present
in many domains where social influence is important, such
as baby names, dog breeds, scientific citations (Bentley
et al., 2004), or even decoration styles in neolithic pottery
(Neimann, 1995), where one can safely exclude the influence
of digital media. The tell-tale of a positive-frequency-dependent
bias is a distribution that is even more skewed in favor
of successful items than power-laws (Mesoudi and Lycett,
2009).
In addition it is difficult, when not impossible without
additional data, to set apart the effect of social influence and
the effect of the intrinsic quality of the items in creating these
skewed distributions (Aral and Walker, 2012; Muchnik et al.,
2013; Morin, 2015). Ghirlanda et al. (2013), trying to deal
with this problem, examined the case of dog breeds popularity.
They showed that desired characteristics of breeds, such as
trainability or good health, were not correlated with their
success. This suggests that, in this specific domain, the role of
popularity, or simply social influence, is more important than the
intrinsic characteristics of the cultural traits, i.e., the dog breeds
themselves.
Some studies manipulated directly the perceived popularity
of items in digital media, trying to detect the effect on their
subsequent success. In a recent experiment, Muchnik et al. (2013)
assigned randomly more than 100,000 comments submitted to
a website with a structure similar to Reddit to three treatment
groups: up-treated (comments were artificially given a +1 rating
at their creation), down-treated (comments were artificially given
a−1 rating at their creation), and control. Up-treated comments
were indeed more likely to be subsequently up-voted than
control. Down-treated comments were, as expected, more likely
to be subsequently down-voted than comments in the control
group. However, they were up-voted to a greater extent, so
that the net effect was slightly positive, even if not significant
with respect to the control group, as if users of the website
tended to counterbalance negative comments. Muchnik et al.
(2013) explain their results as due to an increasing turnout (i.e.,
up- or down-treated comments generated overall more ratings
than comments in the control group) coupled with a common
preference for positive ratings.
In a previous large-scale experiment, Salganik et al. (2006)
created a digital “artificial market” where subjects could listen
to and download unknown songs. Participants in the social
influence condition could see how many times a song was
downloaded previously, and they were randomly assigned
to one of eight “worlds” where the counts of download
were evolving independently. Salganik et al. (2006) showed
that the social influence condition created more inequality
(defined as difference between successful and unsuccessful
songs) and unpredictability (defined as the difference between
songs’ results in the different worlds) with respect to the
independent condition, where participants did not have
information on previous download. Interestingly, two forms
of visual presentation were proposed to participants in
the social influence condition: in the first, the songs were
presented in the same configuration of the independent
condition, simply adding the number of previous downloads,
and in the second they were presented as an ordered list,
with the most downloaded on the top. Social influence
was noticeably stronger in the latter case (more on this
below).
Unpredictability, however, was not complete: there was a
significant correlation between the perceived quality of the songs,
as measured in the independent condition, and their success
in the social influence condition or as Salganik et al. (2006)
put it: “in general, the “best” songs never do very badly, and
the “worst” songs never do extremely well.” Given that choices
(downloading or not a song) were extremely low-cost for the
participants and the fact that the songs were previously unknown,
the effect of popularity seems relatively limited in this experiment
(Lewens, 2015; Morin, 2015, argument more thoroughly for a
similar interpretation of these results). In a follow up study, the
manipulations were stronger, such as completely reversing the
perceived popularity order of the songs, i.e., presenting as the
most popular the “worst” song of the independent condition, and
so on (Salganik and Watts, 2008). Again, however, the best songs
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tended to recover their popularity in the long run. Moreover,
strong distortions of the correlation between intrinsic appeal
and popularity were intuitively perceived by the participants,
as showed by the fact that they resulted in fewer downloads
overall. As above, the effect of popularity seems to be more
nuanced that what an intuitive, clear-cut, understanding would
suggest.
A more extreme version of the explicit advertisement of
popularity cues is the proliferation of “top-N” lists. The spreading
of top-lists predates digital media, and it is almost an hallmark of
the broadcast era (in the United Kingdom the first introduction
of a top-chat program in BBC radio dates back to 19573), but
it reached enormous diffusion in the recent years, with on-
line top-lists of virtually everything. From a cultural evolution
perspective, top-lists are not only sources of cheap estimates
of popularity, but they also supply a direct way to implement
a variant of the above mentioned conformist-bias, giving
disproportionate publicity to already popular items (Acerbi and
Bentley, 2014). The presentation of alternatives in form of top-
lists, or ranked tables, do seem to enhance popularity influence
(Salganik et al., 2006).
Another, more elaborate, variant of popularity displays
is represented by the spreading of information in form of
consumer—as opposed to “expert”—reviews, whether as a part
of commercial websites (such as Amazon), or through websites
specifically dedicated to reviews (such as Tripadvisor, Yelp,
etc.). The positive economic effect of favorable reviews has
been shown in several domains, including books (Chevalier
and Mayzlin, 2006), restaurants (Luca, 2011), or hotels (Ye
et al., 2009). The where-to-go-to-dinner example I used to
illustrate cultural transmission biases looks rather outdated
nowadays, when people can glance at their smartphones and
obtain cheap, real-time, information on all restaurants in their
surroundings. Finally, a large number of websites and, in
particular, almost all social media and commercial websites,
provide direct personalized recommendations, e.g., “inspired by
your browser history" in Amazon, “who to follow” in Twitter,
etc.
Consumer reviews and recommendation systems have
complex effects on users’ preferences (Duan et al., 2008; Fleder
and Hosanagar, 2009) that is not possible to explore in this
article. Moreover, the contemporary trend might even be to
replace these explicit systems with more subtle presentation cues,
embedded in the layout of the user interface, or simply deciding
the informations that are presented and the informations that are
not, as in Facebook News Feed (Vanderbilt, 2016). These recent
and less recent (such as top-lists diffusion) developments are
stimulating material for future cultural evolutionary studies, and
looking at them through the perspective of cultural transmission
biases seems a promising direction.
In conclusion, the details of how popularity influences the
spreading of cultural traits need further investigation. The
quantitative data resulting from digital media usage may be
of great significance for this endeavor. At the same time,
new ways to signal and perceive popularity in the digital
3https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pick_of_the_Pops
environment represent an important new area of research for
cultural evolutionary studies.
4. PRESERVATIVE AND RECONSTRUCTIVE
CULTURAL TRANSMISSION
How faithful is cultural transmission? While, in the popular
image, cultural “evolution” implies that ideas and behaviors
spread by replicating gene-like from individual to individual,
practitioners tend to be more cautious about the analogy genes-
cultural traits, in particular regarding fidelity of transmission.
The term “meme,” invented by Richard Dawkins, is dismissed
by the majority of cultural evolutionists, even though sometimes
used in social-media literature (e.g., Weng et al., 2012; Adamic
et al., 2014).
The oral transmission of stories provides a case in point.
Transmission chain experiments, where individuals are asked
to iteratively listen to and repeat short narratives (starting
from Bartlett, 1932), have shown that, because of memory
and attention limits, or biases from previous knowledge, the
original material is quickly disrupted (more on transmission
chain experiments below). In fact, what is surprising is on the
contrary how some orally transmitted folktales have remained
relatively stable through centuries or even millennia (Graça da
Silva and Tehrani, 2016).
There are various options to explain cultural macro-stability.
Some (see e.g., Sperber, 1996; Sperber and Hirschfeld, 2004;
Morin, 2015) prefer to concentrate on universal, or slow-
changing, factors of attraction that make some cultural traits,
or some features of them, particularly memorable, or more
likely to be reproduced individually. The stability of a long,
oral, transmission chain of a story—say Cinderella—does not
depend on a series of faithful acts of copying, but on the
fact that some features of the story are particularly likely to
be remembered and reconstructed in successive retellings (the
example of Cinderella is used in Acerbi and Mesoudi, 2015). The
Pumpkin Coach might be one cultural attractor, as an example
of a minimally counterintuitive concept (a concept that mainly
fits our intuitive cognitive expectations but with few exceptions;
for an analysis of the success of folktales due to the presence of
minimally counterintuitive concepts see Norenzayan et al., 2006);
another might be the relationship between Cinderella and the
wicked stepmother (stepparents are considered a serious threat
for stepchildren from the point of view of kin selection theory,
see Daly and Wilson, 1999).
Others links instead macro-stability to precision of
transmission at individual level (micro-stability). Some focus on
the fact that, compared to other species that make nevertheless
use of social learning, such as other great apes, humans are
faithful copiers (Tennie et al., 2009; Dean et al., 2012). Another
possibility is that the above mentioned transmission biases
provide a way to repeatedly encounter the same behavior,
supplying redundancy to the process of cultural transmission
(Boyd and Richerson, 1985). Finally, another option yet is
provided by epistemic technologies (Sterelny, 2006), i.e.,
modifications of the external environment that improve
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individuals’ cognitive abilities, in this case specifically related
to facilitate transmission, including extensive apprenticeship or
practice.
Acerbi and Mesoudi (2015) argued that these explanations
are not mutually exclusive, and that their importance varies
depending, among other things, on the domain being studied.
Some cultural domains, such as orally transmitted stories,
can be considered mainly based on reconstructive cultural
transmission, i.e., they derive their stability from the presence
of features that are likely to be reconstructed each time by
individuals, no matter how faithful is the process of transmission
itself. Other domains, for example complex technologies, are
characterized by preservative cultural transmission, implemented
through faithful copying and external epistemic technologies.
As might be expected, reconstruction and preservation, or
attraction and faithful copying, are important, in various
degrees, in all cultural domains. Rhymes are epistemic tools
that make attractive stories even more transmissible (Rubin,
1995); recipes books contain scripts that make universally
palatable dishes easier to prepare (Acerbi and Mesoudi,
2015).
Digital media can therefore be considered as a technology
that makes cultural transmission more preservative. Cinderella
does not need to be listened to, remembered, and retold, but
can be “shared” in social media, and practically replicated
with extremely low mutation rate. In this sense, the usage
of the term “meme” for content that spreads in digital
media could be possibly reconciled with its meaning in
cultural evolution. An interesting question, from a cultural
evolution perspective, is whether the degree of fidelity of
transmission influences the kind of content that is more likely
to spread.
Cultural evolutionists have investigated content effects
experimentally mainly using the above mentioned transmission
chain methodology. Transmission chain experiments show that
the distortion of the content are consistent, that is, some
kinds of content tend to survive along the chains, and others
do not. A growing, if somehow unsystematic, catalog of so-
called content biases is being built, including among others:
a bias for social information (or gossip), involving peoples’
relationships and interactions (e.g., Mesoudi et al., 2006); a
bias for survival-relevant information, such as location of
resources or predators (e.g., Stubbersfield et al., 2015); a bias
for content that elicits emotional reactions, especially related
to disgust (e.g., Eriksson and Coultas, 2014); a bias for the
above mentioned minimally counterintuitive concepts (e.g.,
Barrett and Nyhof, 2001); a negativity bias, where negatively
valenced information is preferred to positively valenced one
(Bebbington et al., 2017); a bias for simplicity in linguistic
structure (balanced by informativeness, e.g., Kirby et al., 2015),
and so on.
However, what if information can be easily reproduced with
high-fidelity, as it happens in preservative digital transmission?
Promising steps in this direction have recently been made, for
example, by experiments from Eriksson and Coultas (2014)
and Stubbersfield et al. (2015), which considered each passage
in the transmission chain as composed by three distinct
phases: choose-to-receive, encode-and-retrieve, and choose-to-
transmit. The choose-to-receive and the choose-to-transmit
phases indicate respectively the willingness to receive and to
circulate cultural information. They are comparable to social
media “share,” as they do not require the memorization and
the repetition of the material, which are required only in
the encode-and-retrieve phase. Eriksson and Coultas (2014)
found that the bias favoring disgust-related information was
operating in the same way in all phases of the transmission.
Stubbersfield et al. (2015) compared social and survival
information biases, and they found that social information
bias had an advantage on survival information bias only in
the encode-and-retrieve phase (i.e., the “standard” transmission
chain methodology), but not in the choose-to-receive and
choose-to-transmit.
Berger and Milkman (2012), with a different approach,
examined directly what people share in a 3-month “field
study” conducted on New York Times articles. Among other
findings, they report that the most shared articles were
characterized by a preponderance of positive emotion-valenced
terms with respect to negative emotion-valenced ones. This
might appear surprising when compared with transmission
chain studies that found, on the contrary, that a story with
negative content had an advantage in terms of probability to
spread and to not be distorted (Bebbington et al., 2017). This
negative bias, in terms of favoring attention and memorization,
has been confirmed in several experiments, and there are
evolutionary reasons to think that negative information should
be more salient than positive one (Fessler et al., 2014). One
way to reconcile these findings with the results of Berger
and Milkman (2012) might be indeed to consider that they
studied a paradigmatic case of digitally-mediated preservative
transmission, whereas the findings supporting the importance of
a negative bias come from cases of reconstructive transmission,
or simply related to recall. In this particular case, digital
media would favor—because memory and reconstruction are
less important than, perhaps, self-presentation motifs, and
desire to share positive content with familiars and friends—
different content with respect to traditional oral transmission.
Other features, for example simplicity and repetitiveness,
which have been shown important for the maintenance
of oral traditions (Rubin, 1995), seem to contribute in
the same way to the success of digital content (Shifman,
2012).
Interestingly, some social media texts, in particular Facebook
updates, come with the explicit instruction to “copy-and-paste”—
as opposed to share—them. It is not entirely clear why this is
the case4, but, from the point of view we are discussing, copy-
and-paste reintroduce variation in highly preservative digital
transmission, allowing for modifications that could make the
messages more successful (Acerbi and Mesoudi, 2015). Adamic
et al. (2014) estimated a “mutation rate” ofµ = 0.11 for Facebook
4One reason might be that shared malicious messages or hoaxes, if reported as
such by users, can be easily traced back to the original, and in case all the thread
can be deleted by administrators of the social media. Each copy-and-pasted status,
by contrast, is an independent piece of content, and can not be immediately linked
to the others.
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status updates asked to be copy-and-pasted, i.e., 11, every 100
copies, were different from the original, which is extremely high
considering the fidelity provided by the digital support.
In fact, some researchers (for example Shifman, 2013) have
proposed that one of the main features of internet “memes” is
to provide templates that individuals use to introduce personal
innovations. Whereas, in oral transmission reconstruction is
practically unavoidable, in digitally-supported transmission the
content is actively modified by individuals. Shifman (2013)
distinguishes two major ways individuals use to modify content:
“remix,” involving the digital editing of pre-existent material,
and “mimicry,” involving the actual creation of a new content,
inspired by the source. A well-known example of remix
is the “Hitler Reacts” meme5, where fake subtitles, often
related to contemporary popular culture topics, are added
to a scene of the 2004 movie “Downfall,” where an angry
Hitler addresses his strict collaborators in his bunker few
days before committing suicide. An example of mimicry is
instead “Harlem Shake.” In the first 2 weeks of February
2013 around 40,000 videos, in which groups of people dance
on the music of the song “Harlem Shake,” were uploaded to
YouTube6. The videos are all based on the same concept:
they usually start with a single person dancing, surrounded
by other people apparently indifferent to the event. Suddenly,
the entire group starts to dance, generally with exaggerated
and spasmodic-looking movements, often using props and
costumes.
More studies are needed to clarify whether there is a specific
effect of digital media on the content that is transmitted, but,
again, cultural evolution may provide a favorable perspective
to investigate this problem. In addition, the distinction
preservative/reconstructive is only one of the possible ways to
look at the effects of supporting cultural transmission digitally. It
has been argued, for example, that universal factors of attraction,
or stable content-biases, are especially important with respect
to context-based transmission biases (such as popularity and
prestige, examined in the previous sections) when cultural
transmission chains have two properties. First, they extend
through long time-scales, and, second, they are “narrow,” that
is, the connections between individuals are sparse (Morin, 2015).
Digital media seem exactly to be the opposite case, providing fast
spreading and high connectivity between individuals (Doer et al.,
2012). On the other side, successful cultural traits that spread
through digital media can reach enormous diffusion—the well
known Gangnam style music video has, as of September 2016,
more than two and half billions views on YouTube7—which may
imply they can reach a very diverse audience, possibly by tapping
common psychological preferences.
As above, this review of the cultural evolution literature
suggests a way to frame possible questions, more than providing
answers. Does the fact that digital media support cheap and
high fidelity transmission have an influence on the kind of




mechanisms that introduce variation in digital transmission? Are
universal cognitive biases more, less, or equally important in the
digital age?
5. TAKING THE LONG VIEW
Overall, very few studies in cultural evolution have dealt with
these subjects. As a consequence, this review is only proposing
some possible directions, and, mainly, suggesting that cultural
evolution can provide a “long view” to the contemporary digital
environment. When put into perspective, the new phenomena
that characterize our digital age appear to have their roots in
deeper psychological and historical dynamics, and, to understand
what is genuinely new and what is not, we may need to take
seriously these dynamics.
The spread of massive digital misinformation, for example, is
considered one of the most worrying contemporary global risks
by the World Economic Forum8. Models that explicitly address
the spread of misinformation in social networks (Acemoglu
et al., 2009; Del Vicario et al., 2016) could greatly benefit of
the inclusion of the knowledge developed in cultural evolution.
The transmission chain experiments mentioned in the previous
section show that certain kinds of information, related for
example to gossip or disgust, are more likely to spread than
others. How these, and others, predispositions to be influenced
in cultural transmission interact with the novel characteristics of
digital media (such as high fidelity of transmission, speed, etc.) is
material for future studies.
A similar reasoning can be applied to another allegedly
worrying phenomenon associated to digital, in particular social,
media, that is, the formation of echo chambers. The term
“echo chambers” describes the fact that individuals tend, in
social media, to associate in communities of like-minded people,
and they are thus repeatedly exposed to the same kind of
information (e.g., a political ideology) and, especially, they are
not exposed to information that could counterbalance it. More
concerning, it has been suggested that groups of like-minded
people tend to produce opinions that are not an “average” of
the opinions of the members of the groups, but their radical
version, according to a phenomenon called “group polarization”
(Sunstein, 2002).
The empirical evidence for the existence of echo chambers in
social media is, however, mixed. Studies showing their existence
considered explicitly separated communities of individuals (e.g.,
Facebook users associated to groups coded as “science news”
and “conspiracy theories” in Del Vicario et al., 2016), whereas
other researches gave a more nuanced image. Barberá (2014), in a
study of Twitter accounts from Germany, Spain, and the United
States, found that the usage of social media decreases political
polarization, arguing that social media contains more weak ties
(i.e., acquaintances or occasional contacts as opposed to close
friends or family) with respect to oﬄine networks. In another
example, Shore et al. (2016) found that Twitter users post links
that are, on average, more moderate than the links they receive in
8http://reports.weforum.org/global-risks-2013/risk-case-1/digital-wildfires-in-a-
hyperconnected-world/
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their feed, and that the perception of polarization at global level
is due to the activity of a core of few, but more active, extremist
users.
As above, a cultural evolution approach suggests to look
at polarization, and echo chambers formation, from a broader
perspective. Cultural evolutionists have identified, among the
cultural transmission biases discussed in the previous sections,
one that refers to “self-similarity,” i.e., to the fact that individuals
preferentially copy from others similar to them. This has been
particularly studied for the arbitrary signals that mark ethnic
groups membership. As in the case of prestige bias, or popularity
bias, there are reasons to think that a self-similarity bias is an
adaptive strategy. The logic is that people of the same group are
more likely to live in similar situations, and thus to share the same
challenges (Henrich, 2016). Onemay thus wonder whether or not
social media are amplifying the effects of the similarity bias with
respect to oﬄine interactions. How polarized are groups of oﬄine
friends or coworkers? And what about traditional, broadcast,
media?
The broad perspective suggested by cultural evolution does
not imply, of course, that the recent modifications produced
by digital media are not important, or that media are neutral,
and they do not influence what is transmitted. On the contrary,
the long view proposed here might be necessary to bring
out clearly the novelties. An example toward this direction
concerns the incredible amount of user-generated content that
has been developed and published with the advent of the so-
called Web 2.0, such as blogs, videos, or wiki platforms (van
Dijck, 2009). If the motivations of producing some of this
content, for example in the case of blogs or video sharing,
are likely to be self-promotional, other collaborative enterprises
(e.g., Wikipedia, or the WikiHow platform) are more puzzling
from a cultural evolutionary point of view. It is common, in
cultural evolution (starting from Rogers, 1988), to consider
social learners as “information scroungers,” that do not pay the
cost—and avoid the risk—of individual trial-and-error, relying
on the effort of individual learners (Rogers’ model shows that
populations composed by only, or a great majority of, social
learners can not track environmental variation). However, digital
media made obvious that, if they have the possibility, individuals
seem to be happy to provide, for free, information to unknown
“scroungers.” How, and to what degree, this may provide a
return in terms of reputation or within-group advantage is an
interesting question for cultural evolutionary studies of digital
media.
Finally, digital media interactions involve substantial changes
in the form in which information is transmitted. On one
side, digital media favored a surge of text-based, as opposed
to oral, communication. For example, the majority of day-
to-day conversations between US teenagers happen through
text messaging. Non-digital, in person, contacts are in fourth
position, preceded by instant messaging and interactions through
social media websites9. Arguably, previous works on the
differences between oral cultures and cultures where writing
is widely diffused (e.g., Ong, 1982) are an intriguing starting
9http://www.pewinternet.org/2015/08/06/teens-technology-and-friendships/
point to shed light on this phenomenon. Ong (1982), for
instance, classified (his) contemporary culture as characterized
by a “secondary” orality, i.e., the orality promoted by traditional-
broadcast media, profoundly influenced by writing and thus
different from the primary orality. One could use the term
“secondary literacy” to describe the current situation. Secondary
literacy provide, as primary literacy, a way to improve
micro-stability of transmission, making it highly preservative,
as discussed at length in the previous section. However, it
also differs from primary literacy in several respects, including,
among others, a more widespread utilization, informal tone,
and instantaneity of transmission. In parallel, transmission
based on digital media is characterized by the facility of
including non-written content, such as images and videos. A
significant proportion of the content successfully spreading
in the digital environment is in fact characterized by a
combination of visual and textual features (think, for example,
to image-macro“memes” such as LOLcats, or “demotivational”
posters10).
6. CONCLUSION
In the previous sections I highlighted few of the possible
investigations that a cultural evolution approach to digital media
suggests. One is to look to how traits spread in digital media
through the lens of cultural transmission biases. Transmission
biases, such as preferentially paying attention to prestigious
individuals, or to items that are already popular, are considered
adaptations. As such, they are tuned to the conditions of
small-scale, slow-changing, and orally-based, societies. How
these transmission biases operate in contemporary culture,
in which cultural transmission heavily relies on the support
of digital media, is an important, and so far unanswered,
question. In the same time, I endorsed an elastic view of
these biases. Popularity and prestige are not—or, at least, not
always—blind forces that push people to copy compulsively.
Fears of internet epidemics of extremism, harassment, or
similar, driven by influentials or informational cascades, should
be considered in a broader context. The quantitative data
produced by digital media, together with dedicated experiments,
may help us to understand when and how social cues,
such as prestige and popularity, interact with the individual
evaluation of the content of cultural traits and with other
tendencies.
Next, I examined how digital media can be seen as a
technology that makes cultural transmission preservative, by
providing, practically for free, high fidelity of transmission. This
is quite a departure from the conditions usually examined
in cultural evolutionary experiments, where items are
generally transformed when passing from an individual to
another. In addition, digitally-mediated cultural transmission is
characterized by other features such as speed, dense connections
among individuals, heavy utilization of writing and, in the
same time, facility of combining written and audio-visual
content. How the interactions of these features influence what
10http://knowyourmeme.com/memes/image-macros
Frontiers in Human Neuroscience | www.frontiersin.org 9 December 2016 | Volume 10 | Article 636
Acerbi A Cultural Evolution Approach to Digital Media
kind of content is more likely to spread is another important
investigation.
Cultural evolution is a mature field that could give its
contribution to the exam of contemporary cultural phenomena.
The digitalization of many instances of cultural transmission
seems both relevant for our society and suitable for the
theoretical and methodological tools that cultural evolutionists
have developed. More empirical and modeling works are needed
for this task, and possibly the suggestions sketched here may
provide some guidance.
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